Ein Absatz ist mir in dem lesenswerten Artikel von Buiter über die drohende Schuldenkrise des englischen Staates aufgefallen:
The second major rescue package for UK banks in three months includes very large (and in at least one case potentially uncapped) packages of guarantees and insurance offered to the banks by the state on terms that are not clear. This is very much in the US tradition, promoted by the US Treasury, the Fed and the FDIC, of maximising moral hazard for a given amount of immediate crisis fire-fighting. In the incoming Obama administration, both Treasury secretary Tim Geithner and NEC chair Larry Summers have had many years of experience, in the US and all over the globe, throwing good money after bad in pointless bail-out packages. The trio of Ben Bernanke, Geithner and Summers are likely to produce a veritable moral hazard monsoon.
Ansonsten beschreibt Buiter einen Prozess, wie England die Banken, die als systemrelevant angesehen werden, verstaatlicht und deren giftigen Wertpapiere in einer bad bank gebündelt werden können.